Ideal and Reality: 

The Path to Amending Chinese Arbitration Law

 

Ladies and Gentlemen, Distinguished panelists, dear friends, 

 

My name is David Gu, a partner from TianTong Law Firm.  I am a Chinese arbitration lawyer.  It is my honor to join this distinguished panel and make the presentation: Ideal and Reality: The Path to Amending Chinese Arbitration Law. 

 

The Current Chinese Arbitration Law was enacted in 1994 and was amended twice in 2009 and 2017.  Prior to the birth of Chinese Arbitration Law, Chinese legislators had taken UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985 version) into account.  That being said, mainland China is technically speaking not a Model Law Jurisdiction.  As this diagram shows, to date, 111 jurisdictions including Hong Kong and Macau adopt Model Law, with the latest version in 2006.  In September 2018, the 13th Standing Committee of National People’s Congress announced to include the plan of amending Chinese Arbitration Law in its legislative agenda.  Since then, the debates have arisen as to whether China should literally and directly adopt international standards of arbitration, which are enshrined in Model Law or take a different path to amending the current Chinese Arbitration Law regime.

 

What Chinese Arbitration Law looks like?  What major different features Chinese Arbitration Law has compared to Model Law?  No matter which path we Chinese would take, we must answer these questions first.  On its surface, we may find some differences such as Model Law applies to international commercial arbitration, with the term “commercial” given a broad interpretation; by contrast, although Chinese Arbitration Law adopts a different rhetoric suggesting that it would only address contractual disputes and disputes over property rights, we can see Chinese Arbitration Law generally focuses on civil and commercial issues, but not on international commercial arbitration only.  As to the formality of arbitration agreement, Chinese Arbitration Law suggests that an arbitration agreement must be made in the written form such as contract, telegraph, fax and email, etc. while under Model Law the written form is not necessarily required to establish an arbitration agreement.  The other differences include: under Model Law, ad hoc arbitration is permissible while under Chinese Arbitration Law, except in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, ad hoc arbitration is not allowed in mainland China; under Model Law, competence-competence principle is well established while under Chinese Arbitration Law, when the validity of the arbitration agreement is challenged, both the arbitral tribunal and the competent court have jurisdiction to determine this issue and the court’s jurisdiction prevails where there are parallel proceedings; under Model law, both the arbitral tribunal and the court have the power to order interim measures but under Chinese Arbitration Law, generally speaking, the court has the power to order interim measures; under Model Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedures of challenging arbitrators while under Chinese Arbitration Law, the procedures are set forth, namely, the parties must submit its challenge prior to the first hearing of the arbitration proceeding.  In addition to these differences in legal rules, the mindset of using and developing arbitration under two bodies of law are different: under Model Law, arbitration is a private dispute resolution mechanism, where party autonomy should be encouraged and a pro-arbitration liberal approach is adopted; by contrast, Chinese Arbitration Law was originally enacted in 1994 when China started to move from the center-planned economy model toward the market-oriented model, and therefore arbitration institution, which was perceived as quasi-administrative agency (事业单位 in Chinese) was given an important role to further arbitration, and each arbitration institution has to be regulated by local governments.    

 

Nevertheless, since 1994 when Chinese Arbitration Law was enacted, 25 years have elapsed.  The social and economic landscape of China has been remarkably changed.  As the other panelists have said, China arbitration practice has made a lot of progresses with the arbitration institutions having reformed on its case management capability and arbitration rules, with the Chinese courts having had rendered decisions to create a pro-arbitration judicial environment, and with the central and local governments having had courage to embrace international standards of arbitration.  For example, Mainland China and Hong Kong have recently made the mutual arrangement for granting interim measures by each side’s court in aid of arbitration proceedings seated in Mainland China and Hong Kong; for another example, the Chinese central government and Shanghai local government have recently decided to allow overseas arbitration institutions to administer arbitration proceedings in Shanghai Free Trade Zone, Lingang area.  Bearing all these accomplishments we Chinese have made so far, it seems that we are ready to move on and start to amend Chinese Arbitration Law.  But before doing that, before moving toward the direction set by Model Law, we need to look right at the landscape of Chinese arbitration, recognise today’s reality in China and think about whether to entirely change the Chinese arbitration law regime and become a Model Law jurisdiction.  

 

Here are some factors we should consider.  First, the Chinese government plays and will continue to play an important role in furthering arbitration in China.  Under the support and supervision of the central and local governments, the reform on domestic arbitration institutions would continue, and in the course of furthering arbitration in China, the Chinese government officials have accumulated knowledge and experience about international arbitration, enabling them to provide more support for arbitration community in China.  That being said, whether the Chinese legislative body, National People’s Congress would adopt Model Law in its entirety would be a big question.  Second, the caseload of arbitration is growing fast but is unbalancedly distributed among Chinese arbitration institutions.  By 2018, there are 255 Chinese arbitration institutions.  Although arbitration cases, in its number and value grow very fast in the past few years, the majority of cases with high stakes are submitted to leading arbitration institutions such as CIETAC, BAC, etc.  Although leading arbitration institutions would be able to deal with the reform of Chinese Arbitration Law toward Model Law, can the other local arbitration institutions adapt the changing arbitration law regime in a short timeframe? We need to think about this question.  Third, leading Chinese lawyers and arbitrators with overseas education background and experience, who frequently act as counsel and arbitrator before leading Chinese arbitration institutions, may praise the adoption of Model Law, but it would take some time for Chinese local arbitration community, arbitrator and counsel to get their practice tuned to Model Law.  Fourth, some Chinese courts, such as Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court have embraced international standards of arbitration, but if Model Law is literally adopted in its entirety, can all of the Chinese courts and judges change their mindset from the current arbitration law regime?  This factor should be considered either.  

 

Based on foregoing, I’d like to share some thoughts on amending Chinese Arbitration Law.  First, when amending Chinese Arbitration Law, we should take Model Law seriously as a reservoir of international standards and practice of arbitration, where we may draw inspirations from its spirit and rules.  In the meantime, we should not ignore and must take the existing Chinese arbitration system and practice into account.  Second, we should do whatever we could do to march toward the direction of Model Law.  For example, it might as well introduce the seat of arbitration as a core concept to Chinese Arbitration Law.  Third, we may not necessarily adopt Model Law in its entirety.  For example, it should be cautious to recognize and adopt ad hoc arbitration seated in Mainland China, partly because the social credit system and the credibility of arbitration in mainland China needs to be strengthened and a quick adoption of ad hoc arbitration may increase the number of sham arbitration and overburden Chinese courts with a sharply increased caseload of judicial review of ad hoc arbitration  Fourth, some established principles and rules under Model Law, even if adopted into Chinese Arbitration Law, we may be at our liberty to amend it to fit into our needs.  For example, in BNA v BNB case, the arbitration agreement stipulates that “all disputes shall be finally submitted to SIAC for arbitration in Shanghai”.  The arbitral tribunal, following the competence-competence principle, ruled that it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute, because the arbitration agreement should be interpreted as the SIAC arbitration, seated in Singapore with the place of hearing in Shanghai.  In the setting-aside proceeding, the Singapore High Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, but the Court of Appeal of Singapore reversed the first instance court ruling.  The challenge of jurisdiction in this case squarely followed the competence-competence principle, but it should be noted that when such an arbitration agreement contains a China-related element, and Chinese law may be the governing law of the arbitration agreement, it may be sensible at the early stage of the arbitration to seek an order from the competent Chinese court to interpret such an arbitration agreement, because the Chinese judge may be in a better position than an international tribunal to determine a Chinese law issue, and the arbitral award on merit would be eventually taken to China for recognition and enforcement.  This example illustrates that the current Chinese arbitration law regime serves the purpose of ensuring Chinese judges to have a final say about Chinese law issues, and even if it is not the same with competence-competence principle under Model Law, it is indeed sensible to keep it as it is.  Fifth, some rules in Model Law may be worthwhile being adopted in its entirety to make arbitration more efficient.  Broad categories of interim measures, the arbitral tribunal’s power to directly grant interim measures and the specific standard of granting interim measures under Mode Law could be such areas for Chinese arbitration community to learn from.  

 

This marks the end of my presentation.  Thank you all for your time and I wish you have a good time in Beijing.  

 

理想与现实：中国仲裁法修订之路

 

女士们、先生们，各位嘉宾，各位朋友们：

 

我是天同律师事务所合伙人顾嘉，一名中国仲裁律师。很荣幸今天作为论坛嘉宾的一员和大家分享我的演讲：理想与现实：中国仲裁法修订之路。

 

现行的中国仲裁法于1994年生效，经历了2009年和2017年的两度修订。在中国仲裁法诞生前，中国立法者也对《联合国国际贸易法委员会国际商事仲裁示范法（1985）》（“《示范法》”）进行了考量。严格来说，中国内地并不属于适用《示范法》的司法区。如图表所示，目前全球包括香港和澳门在内，共有111个司法区适用了2006年最新修订的《示范法》。2018年9月，十三届全国人大常委会将仲裁法的修改纳入了立法规划中。此后，业内对于中国仲裁法应该全盘吸收《示范法》中的国际规范还是另辟蹊径展开了讨论。

 

中国仲裁法是如何规定的？中国仲裁法与《示范法》相比存在哪些主要区别？无论中国仲裁法最终选择哪条道路，我们都必须先回答这几个问题。从调整范围上看，我们可以发现：《示范法》主要规制国际商事仲裁，其中“商事”的概念被赋予了较为宽泛的解释；相反，虽然中国仲裁法规定其适用于合同纠纷和其他财产权益纠纷，但可以看出中国仲裁法主要规制民事和商事纠纷，而并不局限于国际商事仲裁。在仲裁协议的形式方面，中国仲裁法规定仲裁协议必须为书面形式，如合同、电报、传真或邮件等。而在《示范法》下，书面形式不是仲裁协议成立的必要条件。中国仲裁法与《示范法》的区别还包括：《示范法》允许临时仲裁，而在中国仲裁法下，中国内地除上海自贸区以外均不承认临时仲裁；《示范法》确立了仲裁庭的自裁管辖权原则，而中国仲裁法规定，仲裁委员会和有管辖权的法院均有权对仲裁协议的效力问题作出决定或裁定，并且如一方当事人请求仲裁委员会作出决定，另一方请求法院作出裁定的，应由法院裁定；《示范法》同时赋予仲裁庭和法院作出临时措施命令的权力，而在中国仲裁法下，通常只有法院有权决定临时措施；在《示范法》下，当事人可以协商决定挑战仲裁员的程序，而中国仲裁法则明确规定了申请仲裁员回避的程序，即当事人必须在首次开庭前提出申请回避的理由。除了前述法律规则的区别以外，两种法律框架下运用和发展仲裁的思路也有所不同：《示范法》将仲裁视为一种私立纠纷解决机制，鼓励当事人意思自治，采取了一种更为自由的支持仲裁的模式；相反，中国仲裁法制定之初恰逢中国由计划经济向市场经济转型，因此作为事业单位的仲裁委员会在仲裁事业的发展中扮演了重要角色，并由地方政府管理。

 

然而，自1994年仲裁法生效至今已逾二十五载。中国的社会和经济形势日新月异。正如其他嘉宾提到的，随着中国各仲裁委员会案件管理能力的提高和仲裁规则的完善，法院裁决创造出有利于仲裁的司法环境，以及中央和地方政府勇于推进仲裁规则与国际接轨，中国的仲裁事业已经取得了长足的进展。例如，近日中国内地与香港签署了关于两地法院发布对彼此仲裁程序下达保全措施的安排；又如，国务院与上海自贸区管委会近期决定允许外国仲裁机构在上海自贸区临港新区内管理仲裁案件。考虑到这些已有的成就，中国貌似已经做好了修订仲裁法的准备。但在此之前，在向《示范法》的方向发展之前，我们应该先来看看中国仲裁的现状，认清中国目前的现实，然后再来考虑是否全面修改中国仲裁法，以及是否转变为一个适用《示范法》的司法区。

 

以下因素需要我们去考虑。第一，中国政府一直，并将继续在中国仲裁发展的事业中担当重要角色。在中央和地方政府的支持和监督下，国内仲裁机构将继续改革，同时在推进中国仲裁事业发展的过程中，中国政府机关工作人员也将进一步积累有关国际仲裁的知识和经验，从而为中国仲裁界提供更多支持。当然，中国的立法机关，全国人民代表大会是否最终会全盘采纳《示范法》尚待观察。第二，中国仲裁受案量正在快速增长，但全国各仲裁委员会的受案量分布不均。截止2018年，中国已有255个仲裁委员会。虽然在过去的几年中，仲裁案件在数量和涉案金额上增长迅速，但多数大额案件都被提交至领先的几大仲裁机构，例如中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会，北京仲裁委员会等。虽然这些领先的仲裁机构有能力应对中国仲裁法向《示范法》方向的变革，但其他地方仲裁委员会能否在短时间内适应这一变化？这是需要我们去思考的一个问题。第三，一些具有海外教育背景和工作经历的中国顶尖律师和仲裁员经常在领先的仲裁机构案件中担任代理人和仲裁员，他们或许会赞成中国适用《示范法》。但对于其他地方的仲裁从业人士，仲裁员和律师而言，可能需要花费更多时间来适应《示范法》的规则。第四，一些中国法院，例如上海市第二中级人民法院，采取了一些与国际接轨的、支持仲裁的规范，但如果中国仲裁法彻底修改为《示范法》，全国所有法院和其中的法官能否在短时间内将办案思路从目前的仲裁法框架下调整过来呢？这也是需要我们考虑的因素之一。

 

基于以上信息，我将与大家分享一些我个人对于中国仲裁法修改的想法。第一，在修改仲裁法时，我们应该将《示范法》视为一个国际规范和国际惯例的资源库，并从其精神和规则中获取灵感。同时，我们不应忽视，更应该考虑中国现行的仲裁体系和实践。第二，我们应该尽可能地向《示范法》指引的方向迈进。例如，我们可以将仲裁地这一核心概念引入中国仲裁法。第三，我们不必全盘接受《示范法》。例如，在中国内地承认与适用临时仲裁就应该谨慎，有部分原因是因为中国内地的社会信用体系和仲裁的公信力仍有待加强，贸然适用临时仲裁可能会增加虚假仲裁的数量，临时仲裁司法审查案件数量的大大增加也会给法院造成过大的压力。第四，针对《示范法》确立的一些原则和规范，即使将其引入中国仲裁法，我们也可自行根据中国的需要对其进行调整。例如，在BNA v BNB一案中，当事人在仲裁协议中约定“所有争议将提交至新加坡国际仲裁中心，在上海仲裁”。该案中的仲裁庭行使了其自裁管辖权，将仲裁协议解释为由新加坡国际仲裁中心管理，以新加坡为仲裁地，庭审地点在上海，并据此决定其有权管辖该案争议。在撤裁程序中，新加坡最高法院高等法庭支持了仲裁庭的决定，但该判决最终被上诉法庭驳回。在该案中，对管辖权异议的处理严格遵守了自裁管辖权原则，但需要注意的是，如果一个仲裁协议中涉及了中国元素，则中国法有可能成为仲裁协议的适用法律。在这种情况下，当事人应当在仲裁程序的前期阶段向有管辖权的中国法院申请确认仲裁协议效力，因为相较于一个国际仲裁庭而言，中国法官更适合对一个中国法问题进行判断，并且实体裁决最终还是要在中国进行承认与执行。这个例子表明，当前的中国仲裁法体系保证了中国法官对中国法的问题享有最终裁判权。即使该规定与自裁管辖权原则不完全一致，将其保留原状更为合理。第五，示范法下的一些规则值得我们全盘接受，以提高仲裁的效率。例如：扩大临时措施范围，赋予仲裁庭直接决定临时措施的权利，明确决定临时措施的标准，这些示范法下的规则值得中国仲裁界借鉴。

 

我今天的演讲到此结束，感谢各位的聆听，希望各位在北京度过一段愉快的时间。